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Abstract 
 
This paper wants to further develop the theory of co-evolution between technology 
and institutions in the network industries by addressing one of the critiques that is 
generally raised, namely the lack of taking into account its dynamics. The paper 
outlines the main steps in the conceptualization of the evolving network industries in 
the context of liberalization and concludes with considerations about how to govern 
their dynamics. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is generally accepted that the network industries have evolved over the past 20 
years and become more liberalized. In parallel, the technologies in the different 
network industries have also somewhat evolved, especially the ICTs that are 
underlying all other technologies. It is also agreed that the governance of some of 
these network industries has evolved from traditional state-owned enterprises to 
unbundled enterprises under regulation to new, more self-organized and decentralized 
forms of governance. But, not only is the latter form of governance still under 
discussion, moreover, it is not yet established in the literature whether this is an 
almost "automatic" evolution or whether these three forms of governance represent 
different more or less stable/coherent configurations. 
 
This is basically a theoretical/conceptual paper. It is grounded in the framework of co-
evolution/coherence between technology and institutions in the network industries 
(Finger, Groenewegen & Künneke, 2005; Finger & Varone, 2006; Künneke & Finger, 
2007). However, in this paper, I want to push the theoretical developments a bit 
further, and ask the question what the dynamics of the network industries actually is 
and how it can or should be governed. By doing so, I will address one of the three 
critiques that are generally formulated against the framework of coherence and co-
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Nicolas Crettenand and Marc Laperrouza for their comments having helped me 
to improve this paper. 
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evolution of the network industries, namely the critique pertaining to its lack of 
dynamics. Indeed, if there is an evolution from monopolistic, via regulated to 
decentrally governed infrastructures, the question arises as to whether this process – 
characterized by both technological (distributed, inverse) and institutional changes 
(regulation by ownership, sector-specific regulation, competition and/or self-
regulation) – unfolds organically or whether it can or should be facilitated by 
appropriate policies on the governance of evolving infrastructures. 
 
This paper is thus structured as follows: 
 
1. In a first section, I will present the basic elements of the framework of co-
evolution and coherence between technology and institutions. More precisely, 
I will schematically present the three main stages or models of the evolving 
infrastructures, namely the original traditional stage/model of integrated public 
ownership or delegated management (still prevalent in the water and 
sometimes the railway sectors), the stage/model of unbundled, partly 
privatized sectors regulated by sector-specific independent regulatory 
authorities) prevalent in the cases of electricity, gas, air transport, and 
sometimes railways), and the emerging model of decentralized competing and 
weakly regulated network industries as in the cases of telecommunications and 
postal services. I will also present the main three critiques that are generally 
addressed to this theory. 
 
2. In a second section, I will relate these three models/stages to different theories, 
namely public management in the case of stage/model 1, regulatory economics 
in the case of stage/model 2, and common-property resources and self-
regulation theories in the case of model/stage 3. 
 
3. In section three, we will then discuss the dynamics at both the technological 
and the institutional levels, both of which, combined, have led to these 
models/stages. In particular, we will critically discuss whether these are stages 
or simply different models, and what the underlying forces of such change are. 
I will also highlight the particular role played by the different types of actors. 
 
4. In the concluding section, we will focus on the governance of the dynamics, 
i.e., the governance of the co-evolution between technology and institutions in 
infrastructures so as to improve the performance of the infrastructures in all its 
dimensions.  
 
 
Initial conceptual framework 
 
This is primarily a conceptual paper. It is grounded in the theory of co-evolution 
between technology and institutions as initially laid out by Finger, Groenewegen & 
Künneke (2005) and subsequently further developed by Künneke & Finger (2007). In 
this first section, I will present this theory in five steps. I will conclude the section 
with a critical appraisal of this theory. 
 
 
Co-evolution 
3 
 
 
In a first step, the framework postulates that infrastructures – or rather infrastructure 
systems – co-evolve as a result of an interplay between technology on the one hand 
and institutions on the other. The evolution of technology can be characterized as 
going, over time, from centralized technologies to more distributed technologies. 
Similarly, in terms of institutions, the evolution goes from centralized institutions 
(government) to more "decentralized" institutions governance, involving multiple 
actors at multiple political levels. These two evolutions mutually influence each other. 
Graphically, the foundations of the basic model can be presented as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Markets 
 
In a second step, the framework postulates that this (co-)evolution is related to the 
development of markets, as the emergence/creation of markets constitutes the very 
purpose of liberalization: more concretely, as technologies evolve from centralized to 
de-centralized technologies and institutions evolve from government to governance, 
the size/value of the market increases, market opportunities open up, the logic of the 
market (as opposed to the logic of government) expands, and, in principle, more 
market actors emerge. According to this framework, markets in the infrastructures are 
basically constrained between the state of technology at any given time and the 
institutional conditions at any given time. In other words, markets in infrastructures 
are bounded both by technology and institutions, yet nevertheless continue to grow.
2
 
Figure No.2 summarizes this second element or step: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  For a critical view on this automatic emergence of markets, see below the discussion on dynamics. 
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Performance 
 
As a next step, we relate co-evolution between technology and institutions to 
performance. The liberalization of infrastructures perspective of course only saw 
economic performance as the relevant performance criteria, and among economic 
performance basically only allocative efficiency was considered to be relevant. This is 
however a far too narrow way of looking at performance. Even from an economic 
point of perspective, one may want to take a more long-term view, valuing also 
dynamic efficiency, and by doing so taking into account innovation and investments. 
Furthermore, in the network industries and besides economic performance criteria 
other criteria are generally equally important, namely operational criteria (accidents, 
incidents, punctuality), social criteria (equity, universal service provision, etc.), 
environmental criteria (e.g., sustainability), and technical criteria (e.g., resilience, 
robustness). 
 
It is important to note that economic performance objectives are only one among 
several other objectives, and furthermore that there is a trade-off among these 
objectives. One cannot optimize all these objectives at the same time. Also, which 
objectives are more important than others is a matter of political choice, and this 
political choice, in turn, is determined by the power relationships of the actors 
involved (see section on dynamics below). Figure 3 summarizes this third step of the 
theory: 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical technical functions 
 
In a fourth step, the theory introduces the idea that, in the case of infrastructure 
systems, there are a series of critical technical functions that need to be ensured so 
that these systems are performing (reference to our article). The identification of these 
critical technical functions has somewhat evolved over time. At the present moment, I 
think that the following three critical technical functions need to be ensured for 
infrastructure systems to function, namely (1) interconnection, (2) interoperability, 
and (3) system management. System management in turn must be subdivided into the 
three following critical technical sub-functions, namely (3a) capacity management 
(i.e., the management of the limited capacities in all infrastructures), (3b) 
controllability (i.e., the ability to control the overall system as a system), and (3c) 
storability (i.e., the ability to buffer the system somewhat). 
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These three critical technical functions are key because they will influence the 
performance of the overall system in its five above defined functions. Figure No.4 
summarizes this fourth stage of theory development: 
 
 
 
 
Configurations 
 
As a fifth step, the framework postulates a certain configurations, within which a 
certain coherence between technology and institutions exists. At the current stage, 
three configurations are identified, which, in themselves are said to be coherent, 
namely: 
 
 The traditional public monopoly, whereby a given infrastructure is owned by 
the state and managed either by a public administration or a public enterprise; 
this stage characterizes the infrastructures before liberalization. However, 
there is also a certain variation of this configuration, namely when the 
infrastructures are owned by the public authorities, yet managed by private 
operators in so-called public-private partnerships (PPPs). Typical water 
(distribution and sewerage), airports, and local/regional public transport are 
such configurations. 
 
 The liberalized, i.e., unbundled infrastructure, whereby service providers are 
competing on the basis of a monopolistic infrastructure (network); governance 
at this stage is ensured by way of independent regulatory authorities; this stage 
characterizes the current configuration of liberalized infrastructures in 
electricity, gas, and railways. 
 
 A next or future stage, whereby infrastructures become much more 
fragmented and decentralized, characterized by the competition of loosely 
coupled networks. This configuration currently characterizes the 
telecommunications infrastructures, as well as the postal services and the 
airlines. Possibly, electricity is moving from the previous to this configuration. 
 
These are three configurations of a certain coherence between technology and 
institutions. Figure No.5 summarizes the 5
th
 step of the framework:  
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In the past, a series of criticisms have been addressed to this framework. I will only 
refer to these criticisms which are actually constructive and aim at improving the 
theory. In particular, the following three substantial criticisms have been made: 
 
 It is said that coherence between technology and institutions is ill defined: 
there are no concrete criteria of what coherence actually is and how it can be 
measured? In the framework, coherence is strongly related to the critical 
technical functions, but it is not exactly clear how. 
 
 Secondly, it is said that the relationship between coherence and performance is 
ill defined: how exactly does coherence relate to performance?  
 
 Finally, it is said the theory lacks a proper conceptualization of the dynamics: 
what is actually driving the dynamics? How does the dynamics relate to the 
coherence (e.g., innovation; how much coherence or incoherence is optimal to 
drive the dynamics)? And is such dynamics unidirectional only? 
 
In this paper, I will address the third criticism only. The two other criticisms are 
currently being addressed by another paper we are working on. 
 
 
Theoretical foundations 
 
The purpose of this paper is thus to conceptualize the dynamics of the infrastructures 
so as to be able to design a possible governance of such dynamics. As a first step in 
this direction, I will identify the theories that characterize each of the above identified 
configurations. The purpose of doing so is to explore to what extent these 
configurations are actually stable and, if they are not, how these configurations would 
evolve.  
 
The first configuration – i.e., the public monopoly and its evolution, the public-private 
partnership – is being covered by a series of theories, the most important of which 
being public management (public administration) and its various evolutions into new 
public management and public contract theory. Traditional public administration 
theory has indeed evolved, but not in the direction of more competition. Rather, it has 
evolved into the direction of giving the public entities more autonomy in their 
management. Furthermore, public-private partnerships have not really evolved out of 
new public management either. The theories underpinning PPP activities rather stem 
from institutional economics and principal-agent theory evolving into contract theory.  
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New public management and contract theory are quite static in that they consider that 
the relationship between the public authorities and the autonomized agency or the 
private partner can be designed in a way that this relationship can be perpetuated. 
Furthermore, both do not consider outside forces to bring any change to this 
configuration. The only conceivable change could be privatization which however 
would not fundamentally change anything, as it would simply require an adaptation of 
the contractual relationship. 
 
The second configuration – i.e., the unbundled infrastructure system – is basically 
covered by regulatory economics. Regulatory economics is the idea to create and 
sustain markets in sectors/industries where certain segments remain monopolistic 
while others can be competitive. Regulatory economics thus deals with problems of 
designing institutions (rules) that create and sustain such markets. Such rules pertain 
to accessing the monopolistic infrastructures, especially to the cost of accessing such 
infrastructures, to using scarce infrastructure resources, especially to the pricing of 
such scarce infrastructure resources, as well as to managing the systemic functions, 
especially to pricing these functions and allocating them to the different users. 
Regulatory economics furthermore also pertains to questions of investment and long-
term sustainability of the monopolistic infrastructures. The focus of regulatory 
economics is exclusively on markets: creating and sustaining markets in 
infrastructures is the paramount objective and all other dimensions which are also 
being regulated – e.g., technical aspects (safety for example) and political 
considerations (universal service or public service) must be subordinated to this 
market imperative so as not to distort these infrastructure markets. Regulatory 
economics is neo-liberal in nature in that regulation should only take place as a last 
resort, i.e., if there are stable monopolistic bottlenecks and if regulatory costs are 
lower than the inefficiencies incurred by the absence of regulation. Regulatory 
economics does not per se exclude dynamics: it does indeed consider that 
monopolistic bottlenecks may disappear as a result of technological evolution, even 
though it says nothing about how such technological evolution occurs and simply 
assumes that technological progress automatically leads to improving markets. 
Potentially, then, the unbundled regulated infrastructure could evolve into free 
markets where monopolistic bottlenecks no longer exist and where therefore 
regulation (access to the monopolistic bottleneck, usage of the scarce resources 
associated with the bottleneck, systemic regulation) no longer is needed. 
Unfortunately, this theoretical consideration – or rather wishful neo-liberal thinking – 
does not really occur: this is basically because even economic regulation develops an 
institutional dynamics of its own which does precisely not make it superfluous. Rather 
the opposite is the case, once such regulation has taken hold, it will generate more 
regulation to the point that the evolution from regulated infrastructure systems to 
markets becomes almost impossible, even though it would be technologically 
conceivable. 
 
There does not currently exist a theory for the third stage I have called competing 
networks. Neo-liberal theory would simply see this third stage as being the stage of 
functioning markets. In this third stage, competition regulation would prevail and no 
other regulation would be needed any longer. It is true that from a regulatory 
economics point of view there only exist full-fledged markets once monopolistic 
bottlenecks have been removed. Thus, neither market economics nor regulatory 
economics can really deal with the phenomenon of competing networks. Such 
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networks, however, are a reality. While there are no longer any bottlenecks one needs 
to regulate access to, competing networks continue to need regulation, namely 
regulation of interconnection and of interoperability, but sometimes also regulation of 
scarce resources (e.g., spectrum). In short, we do not really have a theory of how to 
regulate or govern such competing networks, other than piecemeal approaches to 
some remaining bottlenecks. 
 
Some people have tried to get at these scarce resources by trying to apply common 
pool resource theory to the network industries (de Bruijne & Kars, 2007). Common 
pool resources are resources where there exists rivalry but not excludability. 
However, in the network industries, non-excludability (e.g., to spectrum or to 
airspace) does hardly exist and I do not think that common pool resource theory can 
be applied here. No other theory that could apply in the case of competing networks 
really comes to mind. 
 
In short, for stages one and two theories exist which are static in nature. For the third 
stage/configuration, no real theory exists. None of the theories helps us to discuss the 
evolution from one of the stages/configurations to the other. We thus need to look at 
the transformation process from an empirical point of view. 
 
 
Transformation of the network industries 
 
In this section, I want to look at the dynamics that leads us from stage one via stage 
two to perhaps stage three. I will do this in three separate steps: in a first step, I will 
look at this transformation from a general perspective analyzing both the institutional 
and the technological dynamics. In a second step, I will bring in the actors into this 
dynamics. Finally, I will discuss whether these are steps driven by an underlying 
dynamics or stable configurations. 
 
 
A general look at the evolution of the configurations 
 
The framework considers the evolution of the above configurations as resulting from 
combined institutional and technological change. As said above, it is however not 
clear, from the framework, which is too general, how institutional and technological 
changes interact so as to create this dynamics. However, before being able to analyze 
this very interaction, it is necessary to first understand the dynamics of both 
institutions and technology separately: 
 
 Institutions, I have said, have evolved, in the infrastructures, from government 
controlled monopolies to new forms of governance, leading to both to the 
multiplication of levels (local, regional/subnational, national, 
regional/supranational and global) and actors, namely government, business 
and third sectors as being involved in the governance of the infrastructures 
(see below regarding actors). The question now is what drives this institutional 
evolution (besides technological changes). Two particular forces must be 
mentioned here, namely ideology and globalization. The ideological force is 
important, as it has significantly contributed to weakening nation-states by 
pressuring them to privatize, to deregulate and to outsource, thus leading to the 
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creation of new actors that have come to provide the services formerly 
provided by (monopolistic) government, as well as new actors – regulators – 
that must ensure that these infrastructure systems continue to perform. The 
second institutional force is globalization. Globalization indeed leads again to 
a weakening of the nation-state – in part because globalization creates 
structural financial problems for nation-states forcing them again to privatize, 
as well as legitimation problems, forcing them to improve upon their services 
– and to the creation of new supranational actors in the form of transnational 
corporations and corresponding business associations, as well as to new, 
supra-national actors which now have the role to coordinate the increasingly 
global economy. Such institutional change has been particularly important, I 
would argue, in the evolution from stage 1 to stage 2, i.e., in the evolution 
from integrated public monopolies to competition over the networks. Indeed, 
this change was basically ideologically motivated (with the exception of 
telecommunications, technology was not ready for such a change), as well as 
driven to a certain extent by new global firms who saw business opportunities 
in unbundled infrastructure systems (considering that business is only 
interested in the lucrative portions of the infrastructures, thus unbundling). 
 
 Technological systems, as said above, have evolved from more integrated one 
to more distributed and therefore complex ones. This creates additional 
interfaces because of a multiplication of nodes and links. Examples can be 
found in all the infrastructures. Let me mention, for example, smart grids 
which reflect an evolution in grid technology and metering, which allows for 
much more active grid operations. Other examples are railways, where new 
interfaces between trains (e.g., ERTMS) and infrastructures allow for better 
interoperability and thus for more distributed operations, just as was the case 
earlier in air transport. The question again is what drives such change of 
technological systems (besides institutional changes, see above). The most 
obvious force that comes to mind here are the information and communication 
technologies, which basically lower the transaction costs (coordination costs, 
monitoring costs) and therefore allow for a certain decoupling of the various 
systems components and whose coordination is subsequently ensured by the 
ICTs. In addition, a second technological force is sector specific and pertains 
to the various systems' components, where independent and sector-specific 
technological innovation is now taking place. I would argue that the evolution 
from stage 2 to stage 3, i.e., from the unbundled infrastructures where 
competition is taking place over existing networks to competing networks 
altogether is basically driven by such technological changes (see below). 
 
Figure No.6 summarizes these two forces driving institutional and technological 
change in the various infrastructures: 
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However, having identified the forces that independently drive the institutional and 
the technological dynamics in the infrastructures does not yet help us to better 
understand the interaction (and thus the co-evolution) between technology and 
institutions. It is nevertheless clear that the institutional change between stages 1 and 
2 has triggered technological innovation in the various unbundled system 
components. This – combined with the pervasive role of the ICTs – as in turn 
significantly contributed to the evolution from stage 2 to stage 3. But I think that in 
order to better understand this interaction one has to look at the particular role of 
actors. 
 
 
Actors and dynamics 
 
In my opinion, neither the institutional dynamics nor the technological dynamics and 
even less so the interaction (co-evolution) between these two can be understood 
without introducing actors. So far, I have not really mentioned actors and pretended 
that the different forces almost unfold by themselves. This is of course not the case. 
Let me therefore now distinguish three types of actors and identify the main 
incentives they respond to. This will then help us better understand the dynamics of 
the infrastructure systems: 
 
 Institutional actors: these are actors that are capable to define the institutional 
conditions (i.e., the incentive structures) under which all other actors, 
including themselves, behave. There are three types of institutional actors, 
namely political actors, public administrators, and regulators. Political actors 
are mainly concentrated at the national and the infra-national levels (state and 
local). Public administrators can be found at the same levels plus also at some 
supranational and even global levels. Regulators in turn can mainly be found 
at the national and supranational levels. The relationships between these three 
types of institutional actors are complex, with the political actors having the 
ability, at least to a certain extent, to define the basic rules. However, 
regulators and public administrators – especially at the supra-national levels – 
also have a considerable potential to define rules. Institutional actors basically 
respond to incentives that relate to discretionary power and less to reputation 
or money.  
 
 Technological actors: these actors have the ability to foster technological 
innovations. By doing so, they force economic and institutional actors to react, 
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to adapt and ultimately to change. There are mainly three types of such 
technological actors, namely university fundamental and applied research labs, 
intra-firm applied research labs and autonomous start-ups, many of which may 
have originated inside universities. There are relatively little relationships 
among these three types of technological actors, except for that fact they 
compete and by doing so stimulate one another. Technological actors mainly 
respond to reputational and to financial incentives and operate of course 
within particular regulatory boundaries. Technological actors emerge parallel 
to the creation of markets in the infrastructures, as competition is one of the 
drivers of technological innovation. 
 
 Market actors: market actors quite logically emerge parallel to the process of 
creating markets in the infrastructures, i.e., parallel to liberalization and to a 
lesser extent parallel to privatization. As liberalization progresses, these 
market actors are increasingly the only ones capable to provide the various 
infrastructure services (see above regarding performance). There are two types 
of market actors as well, namely public enterprises, which may have become 
privatized and thus have become so-called incumbents in their home country, 
and new entrants, which may come from outside the respective sectors or be 
former public enterprises entering new markets. In the network industries, 
markets are relatively concentrated, which means that there is always a quite 
limited number of market actors in any sector. In general, the market actors 
respond to financial incentives, which can be either the consumers of the 
services or the public authorities paying for or subsidizing certain services. 
Especially in the second configuration, there also exist, besides the market 
actors, infrastructure operators (e.g., electricity grid operators, railway 
infrastructure operators, air traffic control service providers, and others more) 
who are not really market actors as they mostly respond to regulatory signals 
and incentives. 
 
It is all these actors, combined, which create the dynamics, i.e., the institutional, the 
technological, and the market dynamics. In other words, no actor – not even the 
political actors – has the ability to shape these dynamics by itself. Rather, all actors 
behave strategically vis-à-vis one another and the dynamics is precisely the result of 
all these strategic behaviors combined. Figure No.7 summarizes the above 
considerations: 
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How stable are configurations? 
 
In other words, there is no dynamics in the infrastructures without or outside of the 
actors. This also means that the very nature of these dynamics as well as its outcomes 
in terms of performance (see below) is ultimately the result of the dynamics. The 
question I would like to address at this point, however, is whether – given the above 
described dynamics as driven by the actors – the three identified configurations are 
indeed stable. 
 
To recall, and as I have shown above (figure No.5), the need for configurations results 
from the idea of coherence, more precisely from the idea that the three critical 
technical functions (interconnection, interoperability, and system management) need 
to be ensured by way of a certain alignment between a given state of technology and 
corresponding institutional arrangements. However, for each of the three 
configurations, different combinations of technology and institutions are possible so 
as to ensure such coherence. The way by which technology and institutions are 
combined (aligned) will in turn determine the performance of the infrastructure 
systems. 
 
The argument made above is that the actors drive the dynamics of the infrastructure 
systems. This would mean that none of the configurations is stable, as the 
multiplication of actors, especially the increase in numbers of technology actors will 
trigger ever more dynamics. However, all actors are incentivized by rules, which in 
turn are shaped at least by certain actors, namely institutional actors (Crozier & 
Friedberg, 1977. In this sense, each configuration represents a certain – more or less 
stable – balance of power among the actors involved, i.e., an institutionalized power 
relationship. This also means that configurations, even though not optimal from a 
performance point of view, can nevertheless be relatively stable given the 
institutionalized power relationships. In this case, what then drives the dynamics, i.e., 
destabilizes any given institutional relationship.  
 
Such institutionalized power relationships can be destabilized in two ways, by actors 
or by (perceived problems of) performance. Certain actors – especially institutional 
actors and technological actors – have the ability to destabilize the institutional 
relations: institutional actors by way of changing the rules and thus the incentive 
structures; technological actors by altering the behavior of the market actors and thus 
by affecting the performance. Performance – especially problems of performance – 
can destabilize the institutionalized power relationships because it will create pressure 
on the actors to align themselves with performance objectives: actors which will have 
to align themselves can be market actors (which have to live up to the performance 
expectations created by innovators) or institutional actors (which will have to change 
the rules so as to align them with changed performance expectations. In both cases, 
configurations will evolve but only to the extent that a certain coherence between 
technology and institutions is maintained so as not to jeopardize the three critical 
technical functions. So, what does that all mean for the governance of the dynamics of 
the infrastructures? 
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Governing the dynamics of the network industries 
 
In this final section, I will develop a conceptualization of how to think about the 
governance of the dynamics of the network industries. In order to do that, however, I 
have to first recall the governance of the three configurations that were identified in 
figure no.5. As a next step, I will relate the dynamics to performance (see also figure 
no.3). Finally, I will discuss how the co-evolution between technology and institutions 
should be governed. 
 
 
Governing the configurations 
 
In figure no.5, I have identified three configurations – public monopoly, competition 
over existing networks, and competition of networks – and located the current state of 
the liberalization of the different infrastructures within these three configurations. I 
stated that each of these three configurations is characterized by a certain coherence 
between technology and institutions in that the three critical technical functions are 
taken care of by particular modes of governance. New Institutional economics 
distinguishes between three such modes of governance, namely hierarchies, markets 
and networks, also called hybrids (Williamson, 1996). Table no.1 illustrates how the 
different critical technical functions are governed in the three configurations: 
 
 Public monopoly Competition over 
networks 
Competition of 
networks 
Interconnection Network  Network Market 
Interoperability Hierarchy Hierarchy Network or 
hierarchy 
Capacity 
management 
Hierarchy Hierarchy Market 
Controllability Hierarchy Hierarchy Market 
Storability Hierarchy Market Market  
 
These three configurations are relatively stable. In each of them, the way the critical 
technical functions are governed is coherent with the state of the current state of 
technology. Above, I have argued that the dynamics of the network industries, i.e., the 
evolution from one coherent configuration to another is basically driven by the actors. 
They will make the different configurations evolve, being aware, however, that  
subsequent technological change may lead to yet other coherent and stable 
configurations not listed above. Also, it must be mentioned at this point this evolution 
can actually go into both directions, i.e., towards more markets, but also towards less 
markets (see figure no.2), depending on the strategic behavior of the actors. 
 
 
Dynamics and performance 
 
To recall, each of the three configurations is coherent between the state of the 
technology and the way the critical technical functions are governed. A certain 
performance – in all its 5 dimensions, i.e., operational, technical, economic, social and 
environmental – is associated with each configuration. Different trade-offs between 
the 5 performance indicators are conceivable even for the same configuration, but 
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further research will have to identify exactly what performance tradeoffs are possible. 
The dynamics of the network industries – i.e., the dynamics created by the co-
evolution between technology and institutions – should, in principle, always lead to 
better performance, ideally in all its five dimensions. However, the actors involved in 
providing the infrastructure services will always seek the performance level that suits 
their interest and that they can get away with given the market and the regulatory 
constraints. In this sense, it is not necessarily true that the dynamics will automatically 
lead to better performance in all its five dimensions.  
 
From a normative point of view, it is desirable that the co-evolution between 
technology and institutions leads to better performance in all the five dimensions. 
However, since – in the age of governance – none of the actors is located above the 
other actors, the performance objectives are set by the involved actors themselves, 
i.e., the actors may well define the performance objectives according to their own 
strategic interests (e.g., profit, power, recognition), which should in turn confer them a 
competitive advantage over the other actors. It is thus imperative that the performance 
indicators are set in a way that they push all involved actors to excel, rather than to 
become complacent, knowing however that there are limits to performance and that 
these limits are set by the way the critical technical functions are governed, i.e., the 
coherence between technology and institutions. 
 
 
Governing the dynamics 
 
Improving performance will be the combined result of technological and institutional 
evolution. This is both a push and a pull relationship. It is "pull" because some of the 
performance indicators cannot be set by the market, because they are either 
externalities (e.g., environmental and social performance), or because the market is 
not fully functioning (yet). Where the market is functioning, there may be push 
factors such as in the case of price, service quality, innovation, i.e., static and to a 
lesser extent dynamic efficiency. 
 
One of the two dimensions of the governance of the dynamics thus must consist of 
promoting market based solutions to infrastructure provision wherever possible (see 
below). This means that the different configurations (where a certain coherence exists 
between technology and institutions) should evolve to include ever more market-
based or network-based modes of governance of the three critical technical functions, 
rather than hierarchy-based ones. And where a hierarchy mode of governance 
prevails, static or cost-based regulations should be replaced by dynamic or incentive-
based regulations. Similarly, the technological evolution in the areas of the five 
critical technical functions should be such that market-based modes of governance 
become viable. Such technological evolution can again be incentivized by appropriate 
regulations (e.g., incentives for technological innovation). 
 
If this is not the case, i.e., if an incoherence between technology and institutions is 
introduced in the co-evolution between technology and institutions the performance of 
the infrastructure systems will suffer. Figure No.8 summarizes this idea in lieu of a 
conclusion: 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper is a contribution to the development of the theory on the co-evolution and 
coherence of technology and institutions in infrastructures. It addresses in particular 
one of the three criticisms that has been addressed to this framework/theory so far, 
namely the criticisms pertaining to the lack of conceptualization of the dynamics. In 
order to better understand and conceptualize such dynamics, the paper introduces the 
role of actors and subsequently conceptualizes the governance of such dynamics. 
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